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 Corporate Social Responsibility and Proﬁt
Maximizing Behaviour1
Leonardo Becchetti2, Luisa Giallonardo2, Maria Elisabetta Tessitore2.
ABSTRACT
We examine the behavior of a proﬁt maximizing monopolist in a horizontal
diﬀerentiation model in which consumers diﬀer in their degree of social respon-
sibility (SR) and consumers SR is dynamically inﬂuenced by habit persistence.
The model outlines parametric conditions under which (consumer driven) corpo-
rate social responsibility is an optimal choice compatible with proﬁt maximizing
behavior.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The ongoing integration of labour and product markets has increased interde-
pendence among countries and concerns for the problem of the insuﬃcient provi-
sion of global public goods. The novelty in this scenario is that global problems
are becoming increasingly correlated with individual well being, with environ-
mental degradation aﬀecting personal health and North-South per capita income
and labour cost divide fuelling illegal immigration and endangering welfare of
workers in the North. This may be one of the reasons why the sensitiveness of
the public opinion toward social responsibility is growing.
The increased sensitivity of individuals and the consequent growing atten-
tion of corporate behaviour toward social responsibility (hereafter also SR) is
conﬁrmed by widespread statistical evidence3.
Regardless to the way we judge this phenomenon, the challenge of the eco-
nomic literature is to incorporate this new feature into its theoretical framework.
1Paper to be presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the EARIE and at the 2005 Meet-
ing of the Association of Studies on Income Inequality. The authors thank Fabrizio Adriani,
Simon Anderson, Michele Bagella, Roberto Cellini, Luca Debenedectis, Benedetto Gui, Mas-
simo Fenoaltea, Iftekhar Hasan, Luca Lambertini, Steve Martin, Ned Phelps, Gustavo Piga,
Pasquale Scaramozzino and Paul Wacthel and all participants of seminars held at the XV
Villa Mondragone Conference, at SOAS in London and the University of Catania, Copen-
hagen, Forlì, Macerata, Pisa and Milano-Bicocca for comments and suggestions received. The
usual disclaimer applies.
2University of Rome Tor Vergata, via di Tor Vergata snc, 00133 Roma.
3The 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends documents that the industry
of ethically managed mutual fund assets accounted in 2003 for 2.16 trillion dollars in the
United States when including all US private and institutional ethically screened portfolios.
According to this ﬁgures one out of nine dollars under professional management in the United
States was part of a socially responsible portfolio. The same Report illustrates that, from
1995 to 2003 the rate of growth of assets involved in social investing, through screening of
retail and institutional funds, shareholder advocacy, and community investing has been 40
percent higher than all professionally managed investment assets in the U.S (240 against 174
percent).
1This extended theoretical framework will help to evaluate the reaction of pro-
ducers’ behaviour to this speciﬁc component of consumers’ preferences and the
equilibrium levels of prices and social responsibility which will result from the in-
teraction of consumers ”concerns” for social responsibility and producers proﬁt
maximizing behaviour.
Our paper aims to perform this task and is divided into ﬁve sections (in-
cluding introduction and conclusions). Section two outlines the main features of
the model of horizontal product diﬀerentiation in presence of SR consumers and
discusses and justiﬁes its basic assumptions. Section three solves the intertem-
poral maximization problem of the proﬁt maximizing monopolist in presence of
consumers with heterogeneous and time varying tastes for SR. In this section
we demonstrate the validity of a proposition which ﬁxes parametric intervals
discriminating among three diﬀerent optimal strategies (permanent, temporary
or no corporate SR), of the proﬁt maximizing monopolist. Section four qualiﬁes
and discusses consequences of these three diﬀerent strategies. In the ﬁfth and
ﬁnal section we provide a parametric example to explain which of the three
strategies will be chosen by the PMP under reasonable parametric values.
2 The model
To analyze the role of social responsibility in product markets we adopt a hor-
izontal diﬀerentiation model in which the traditional unit segment measures
consumers’ tastes about social responsibility instead of geographical distance.
We choose a segment instead of a circle because in SR extremes do not touch,
diﬀerently from what happens for geographical distance in the circumference
of circular spaces. We model product competition in presence of consumers
SR with horizontal instead4 of vertical diﬀerentiation because values and social
preferences are extremely subjective and heterogeneous across individuals as
several empirical papers demonstrate5.
In the model a monopolist transforms a good with unit costs w paid to a
subcontractee and maximizes his proﬁt by selling at the price PA to consumers
with inelastic, unit demands. For simplicity, we assume that his SR consists
4For a reference to the traditional literature on horizontal product diﬀerentiation see
Hotelling, 1929; Anderson, 1987; D’Aspremont, Gabsewicz and Thisse, 1979; Economides,
1984; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986.
5This heterogeneity violates a fundamental element of vertical product diﬀerentiation mod-
els in which more of a given product feature is better for everyone. Empirical support for our
hypothesis on the heterogeneity of individual attitudes toward social responsibility is conﬁrmed
by descriptive evidence from the World Value Survey database - 65,660 (15,443) individuals
interviewed between 1980 and 1990 (1990 and 2000) in representative samples of 30 (7) dif-
ferent countries-. In both surveys around 45 (49) percent of sample respondents declare that
they are not willing to pay in excess for environmentally responsible features of a product.
T h es a m es u r v e yd o c u m e n t st h a tt h es h a r eo ft h o s ea r g u i n gt h a tt h ep o o ra r et ob eb l a m e d
is around 29 percent in both surveys. This simple evidence conﬁrms heterogeneity in the
willingness to pay for social and environmental responsibility, rejecting the assumption that
more of SR may be better for all individuals.
2of paying something above w to his subcontractee. This formalization stylizes
a quite general element of SR which often consists of a wealth transfer from
shareholders to stakeholders6. The model may therefore be considered as a
generalization of diﬀerent cases such as the adoption of a more costly and more
environmentally sustainable production process, an improvement of wage and
non wage beneﬁts of ﬁrm workers or subcontractees, and increase in job security,
etc.7.
Consumers are uniformly distributed across the line segment [0,1],a c c o r d i n g
to their sensitivity to social responsibility, and have a ”conditional” reservation
price Rp, that is, the maximum price they are willing to pay in case of zero costs
of ethical distance. Consistently with the speciﬁc features of the SR model, we
assume that costs of ethical distance are asymmetric, i.e. distance costs are
positive only for consumers moving from the right to the left, because they buy
a product whose ethical standards are inferior to their beneﬁts. On the contrary,
moving from the left to the right is never costly for consumers, by assuming that
their preferences are not aﬀected when they buy a product whose standards are
above their beliefs8. Corporate SR consists of paying a portion a ∈ [0,1] of a
premium s over the cost w of the intermediate output. As a consequence, total
costs for the producers are given by market cost and transfers to subcontractee
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ep r o ﬁt maximizing producer (hereafter also PMP) location on
the segment: w(1 + as).
The goal of this basic version of the model is to analyze what is the eﬀect
of the presence of SR consumers on the behaviour of the proﬁt maximizing
monopolist and, therefore, what kind of eﬀects the existence of SR consumers
may generate on PMP price and SR.
To solve the problem we consider the following condition for the consumer
indiﬀerent between buying or not the product:
6By taking for instance criteria for aﬃliation to the Domini stock index, which is one of
the most well known benchmarks in social responsibility in the US, we ﬁnd that, on about
80 diﬀerent SR items, almost all involve actions which transfer wealth from shareholders to
stakeholders, such as improved workers’ wage and non wage beneﬁts, commitment for the
environment, transparency on overseas sourcing disclosure and monitoring, care for human
rights in relationship with subcontractors, etc.
7In case of producers selling transformed goods to ﬁnal consumers and being monopsonistic
or oligopolistic buyers of raw material products from subcontractees, the mark-up above the
cost w does not need to be a market failure, but may be a solution to it when, in the monopsony,
w is below the marginal value of the intermediate product. Moreover, the monopolist’s decision
of selling a SR good may be viewed as the creation of a new variety of product (a bundle of
physical and SR characteristics) which improves welfare of consumers with SR preferences
(Adriani and Becchetti, 2005).
8Empirical ﬁndings discussed in footnote 5 clearly evidence that a nonzero share of con-
sumers which are not willing to pay extra money for the social or environmental features of
the product exists. These consumers are either indiﬀerent (asymmetric distance) or even ﬁnd
a disutility in buying a product above their ethical standards (i.e., they may believe that
this money is waisted) (symmetric distance). Even though we believe that the asymmetric
distance hypothesis is the most faithful representation of consumers’ preferences on SR, the
simmetry/asymmetry of distance costs may be open to debate.
3½
PA + f(x − a)=Rp
PA = Rp
if x − a ≥ 0
if x − a<0 (1)
where x is consumer location on the segment and f is the marginal psycho-
logical cost of the distance between consumer and producer locations in the SR
space. The cost of ethical distance has a clear monetary counterpart. When the
producer is located at the right of the consumer this cost represents the distance
in monetary terms between the transfer, which is considered fair by the con-
sumer (indicated by his location on the segment) and the transfer provided by
the producer (indicated by producer’s location on the segment). The coeﬃcient
f maps this objective measure into consumers preferences indicating whether
its impact on consumers’ utility is proportional (f =1 ), more than proportional
(f>1) or less than proportional (f<1) than its amount in monetary terms.
We may conveniently deﬁne consumers as ”SR neutral”, ”SR lovers” or ”SR
averse”, respectively, under the three cases.
Eq. (1) shows that PA ≤ Rp is a necessary condition for a positive mo-
nopolist’s market share. On the other hand, if PA >R p − f(x − a),t h e
generic consumer located in x does not buy the product. More generally, if








A ﬁnal feature of our model is the assumption that consumers’ tastes on SR
are not time invariant. Recent empirical ﬁndings support this hardly disputable
assumption showing that habit persistence reinforces socially responsible pref-
erences of consumers. A recent empirical investigation on the willingness to pay
for SR, on a sample of around 1,000 consumers in Italy, shows that the will-
ingness to pay is positively related to the length of SR consumer habits9.T o







f(0) = f0 > 0
(3)
where consumers’ marginal cost of ethical distance ”depreciates” at the rate
θ and is enhanced at any period in proportion of the SR ”commitment” of the
monopolist, weighted for his market share.
Based on these model features, in the following sections we will describe
PMP’s reactions to the existence of SR consumers by analyzing his optimal
strategy conditional to values of initial parameters which crucially aﬀect his
choice.
9See Becchetti and Rosati, 2004.
43 The reaction of the proﬁt maximizing mo-
nopolist to social responsibility
In this section we investigate under which conditions consumers’ sensitiveness
to social and environmental issues may aﬀect producers PMP equilibrium prices




















f(0) = f0 > 0
; t>0; (4)
a ∈ [0,1],P A ∈ [w,Rp]
where ρ is the monopolist’s discount rate, t i st h et i m ev a r i a b l e ,θ measures
consumers’ ”loss of ethical memory”10 and f0 is the initial value of consumer
cost of ethical distance. f is the state variable in the model and the diﬀerential
equation on f is the law of motion, which explains how the variation in con-
sumers’ social responsibility depends, positively, on the current consumption of
socially responsible products given by the ethical portion of PMP’s market share
and, negatively, on the ”loss of ethical memory”. Finally, a :[ 0 ,+∞[ → [0,1]
and PA :[ 0 ,+∞[ → [w,Rp] are the two control variables. To solve problem
(4) we must take into account the critical condition in (1) because, anytime
x − a ≤ 0 holds, the PMP will choose PA = Rp and problem (4) does not exist
anymore, since PMP’s market share would be equal to 1.
By deﬁning λ(t) as the costate variable of the problem, and by analyzing
PMP’s optimal location on the ethical segment in our stylized model, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 1. The monopolist PMP, fully informed on the distribution of
consumer tastes along the ethical segment, has three possible location strategies,
conditional on the observed values of some crucial model parameters :
1) (no SR stance)the PMP always chooses to locate at the extreme left of the
segment ﬁxing a price PA =( Rp + w)/2 ∀t;
2) (temporary SR stance) there exists a ﬁnite t = t ∈ ]0;+∞[ such that, on £
t,+∞
£
the PMP always chooses to locate at the extreme left of the segment




, the PMP chooses to ﬁxap r i c e






if λ(t) <s w−
Rp−w
2




10Consider that, for admissible values, the θ<ρcondition needs to be respected.
53) (permanent SR stance) the PMP chooses a location a positive, constant













The Current Value Hamiltonian function of problem (4) is
















The costate variable λ(t) can be interpreted as the marginal cost for the PMP
arising from the variation in consumers’ social responsibility. The constraint of
the problem has a negative impact on the value function. For this reason we
expect λ(t) to be negative, as we will show in Appendix A.1.
By maximizing H with respect to control variables (a,PA) we obtain the

























λ +2 aλ =0 ;
We check second order conditions by evaluating the Hessian matrix of the
Hamiltonian function and its determinant:
HS =
"
















This result implies that, even when we ﬁnd a stationary point of problem
(4), we obtain a saddle point and therefore our Hamiltonian function is not
maximized in it.
Therefore, to ﬁnd the optimal control of the problem, we need to consider
the corner solutions (a,PA) belonging to the boundary of the set [0,1]×[w,Rp].
6i) First of all we analyze what happens when PA = w. It is easy to see that,










dt < 0 (8)
Hence we will not consider this corner solution.




can easily verify that P∗
A ∈ [w,Rp]. By evaluating the Hamiltonian function in
(0,P∗









Eq. (9) will be compared with the Hamiltonian values obtained by consid-
ering the corner solutions left.
iii) When PA = Rp, the optimal control for PMP’s location is a∗(t)=
Rp−w
2(sw−λ(t)). Since a∗(t) depends on λ, we do not know yet whether it is within
the unit segment. So we have to consider this solution (a∗(t),R p) as a possible












if λ(t) <s w−
Rp−w
2












iv) The last side of the corner solution to analyze is a =1 . In this case the
PMP’s market share becomes x =
Rp−PA
f +1≥ 1. In such situation the PMP
would conquer the whole market (x =1 ) because his product is fully ”ethical”
and bought also by the most socially responsible consumers in the market.
Consequently, it makes no sense to analyze problem (4) along a =1 , because
it is always x − a =0and, from equation (1), PMP’s price is PA = Rp. This
happens because a market share equal to 1 leads the PMP to ﬁxt h em a x i m u m
price he can. This corner solution can be seen as a particular case of corner
solution along the boundary PA = Rp.
The two possible solutions of problem (4) are therefore controls (0,P∗
A)a n d
(a∗(t),R p), the latter under condition (10). To choose the best solution among
them we need to compare equations (9) and (12). By doing this we ﬁnd that
t h eP M Pc h o o s e sa so p t i m a lc o n t r o l( 0,P∗
A)w h e n
7f(t) <s w− λ(t) (13)
while he chooses the corner solution (a∗(t),R p)o t h e r w i s e .
The inequality (13) provides an interesting insight on the role of λ(t). Since
the costate variable is negative, as we will show in Appendix A.1, the higher is
λ(t) (the lower in absolute value), the more PMP choice of partial SR is likely
to occur. A high value of λ(t) implies lower PMP costs from positive changes in
consumers SR, so that the PMP is less reluctant to move from the left extreme
of the ethical segment.
To discriminate between these two choices and solve the problem of the
unknown value of λ(t) we formulate two alternative hypotheses on limit values
of the critical condition stated above as far as t approaches inﬁnity and explore
their consequences in terms of the PMP’s behaviour.
In fact, it is possible that condition (13) holds only for some time intervals.
In this case we would have the so called bang-bang controls. However, since
λ(t) is unknown, we can not establish when the condition is veriﬁed or not.
Moreover, we do not know the value of λ(t) because it depends on which is the







=( θ + ρ)λ(t)+
Rp − w
f(t)2 [PA − w(1 + a(t)s)+λ(t)a(t)] (14)
for which we do not have an initial value for the costate variable.
Nevertheless, we can derive a terminal condition on λ(t) by considering the
transversality condition on the Hamiltonian (5)11:
lim
t→∞He−ρt =0 (15)
For this reason we formulate two alternative hypotheses on condition (13)
starting by inﬁnity. In this way we are able to evaluate λ(t) and to use it to
calculate f(t), which depends on λ(t) itself12. At this point all variables in the
law of motion are well-known and, given the initial value f0, it is easy to solve
the Cauchy problem to ﬁnd f(t). The solution of the problem following the
outlined approach yields what stated in Proposition 1. Details on the solution
are provided in Appendix 1.
11See Michel, 1982.
12Actually, f(t) depends on a(t), which could depend on λ(t), when f(t) >s w− λ(t).
84 Observations about the three cases
In this section we analyze characteristics and consequences of the three cases
outlined by Proposition 1.
4.1 Case 1. The monopolist PMP does not choose SR
Under CASE 1 the PMP does not care about consumers’ ethical sensitiveness
and locates at the extreme left of the segment. The equations for state and









Under this case PMP’s products do not incorporate ethical features and con-
sumers’ sensitiveness to SR (the psychological cost of ethical distance), without
consumption habit reinforcement, will progressively depreciate and go to zero.
The existence of SR consumers, however, is not without consequences. In fact,
it will create a downward pressure on prices because ”concerned” consumers
accept to buy non SR products only if their price, adjusted for the cost of eth-
ical distance, is smaller than their ”conditional” reservation price Rp. In such





would be equal to zero. Consequently, he chooses his price as to maximize the




It is important to note that, given equation (16), we have lim
t→∞f(t)=0 .
This means that, going to inﬁnity, we can not consider any longer the maximum
problem stated by (4), because PMP’s market share can not be written as it is
in equation (2). However, for f → 0,P A → Rp and consumers’ sensitivity to SR
vanishes, as we observe from the indiﬀerence condition (1). In this way PMP’s
market share will be equal to 1 when t →∞ .
Actually the PMP will reach the whole market (x =1 ) very much before,
when x =
Rp−w
2f0e−θt =1 , that is when









However, the optimal price will be always P∗
A, because consumers would never
agree to pay the ”conditional” reservation price for a non ethical product and
would accept to buy those products only if their price is suﬃciently low. When
t →∞ ,f→ 0 and they pay PA = Rp, letting the PMP gain a proﬁte q u a lt o
Rp−w
ρ .
We also note that, for some values of f0, t1 is negative, thereby implying
that the PMP conquers the whole market since t =0 , with a price P∗
A.
9Consider also that CASE 1 needs inequality f(t) <s w− λ(t) to hold for
every t ∈ [0;∞[. This shows that CASE 1 will occur for very low values of f0,
as we will see in Appendix 2.
4.2 Case 2. The monopolist PMP chooses partial SR until
consumers’ sensitiveness fades
We deﬁned CASE 2 as the situation in which there is a positive t such that,
for t<t (t>t), the PMP will (will not) incorporate ethical features in the







,which is a third order equation in f always giving only one
real and positive solution, according to Cartesio’s theorem.
For t<t we have the following diﬀerential equations
f0(t)=−θf(t)+a∗2(t) (19)
λ
0(t)=( ρ + θ)λ(t) (20)
For λ(t) the ﬁnal condition is given by λ(t)=λ and, for f(t), the usual
initial condition is f(0) = f0. We can ﬁnd t evaluating the solution of the




















sw − λe(θ+ρ)(r−t)¢2dr + f0
#
= f (21)
A solution for t does not always exist, because the right hand side is increas-
ing in t and has a horizontal asymptote that can be also lower than f. When
this happens CASE 2 does not occur, as we will see better in the parametric
example provided in Section 5.
CASE 2 indicates the possibility for the PMP to choose partial SR just for
an initial ﬁnite period. This choice is crucially inﬂuenced by the high initial
consumer sensitiveness for social responsibility. The PMP adapts himself to
new consumers’ tastes, selling products with SR features. As time goes on, he
beneﬁts from the progressive vanishing of that sensitiveness, choosing locations
closer and closer to the left extreme of the ethical segment, until t = t, when
his optimal location falls to a =0 13.
13Figure 5.1 in the next section provides four examples of locations in which CASE 2 occurs.
104.3 Case 3. The monopolist PMP chooses a permanent
level of SR
CASE 3 describes the situation in which the monopolist always chooses to incor-
porate, to some extent, SR features in his product. The optimal location does
not depend on t,b e c a u s eλ(t)=0 ,s ot h a ta(t)=a∗(t)=a∗ =( Rp−w)/(2sw).
The reason for a null costate variable can be found by considering that, in the
main problem (4), if PA = Rp ∀t ∈ [0;∞[, the maximizing functional does not
depend anymore on f(t). Problem (4) becomes at this point an unconstrained
maximum problem with λ(t)=0 . When the price is ﬁxed at Rp, the decision to
buy or not depends uniquely on consumer position on the segment and not on
the cost of ethical distance (if the consumer is located at the left (right) of the
ﬁrm he does (does not) buy whatever its costs of SR distance). This is why the
functional does not depend on f(t).
CASE 3 calls for a relatively high initial value of consumers’ cost of ethical
distance f0. This parameter should be, as we explain in Appendix 2, at least
greater than sw. B u tt h i si sn o ts u ﬃcient to ensure that CASE 3 holds. Other
parameters should be such that equation (19) can not let f(t) fade. This happens
for example when a∗ is particularly high, because of a high spread between Rp
and w or a low value of the transfer s. This spread implies high proﬁts for the
PMP when it does not imitate, because he can choose higher values for his price
PA. Without PMP’s SR, on the contrary, the latter is ﬁxed at Rp and therefore
PMP’s market share is lower. Moreover, the smaller is s, the more plausible is
CASE 3, because, if transfers are low, then costs of becoming ethical are low
too14.
In the next section we are going to illustrate some interesting examples for
given values of initial parameters.
5P a r a m e t r i z a t i o n
The nice feature of our problem is that it has well deﬁned and sound parametric
assumptions. Hence, by looking at parametric examples of our solution we may
draw quite general and interesting lessons from Proposition 1.I no r d e rt oﬁnd
the optimal controls of problem (4) we will bear in mind the three propositions
outlined in the paper (Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are deﬁned in Appendix
2).
We will illustrate two scenarios of initial parameters. Inside those we will
let that the initial psychological cost of social responsibility f0 and the amount
of transfers s assume diﬀerent values, being these variables more likely to vary
than other parameters in the reality.
First of all, we conveniently ﬁx ρ =0 .05 and θ =0 .04, respecting the condi-
tion θ<ρ .Tables 1.A and 1.B show results for both scenarios in which π1,π 2
14Further details on the parametric conditions needed to discriminate among the three cases
are provided in Appendix 2.
11and π3 measure PMP’s proﬁts if CASE 1, CASE 2 or CASE 3 respectively hold.


























¶2 sw − 2λe(θ+ρ)(r−t)


















Table 1.A shows results for Rp =2with w conveniently normalised to
one. Under this parametric conditions consumers conditional reservation price
is twice as high as the market price paid to the subcontractee by the PMP. Table
1.A has nine columns: the ﬁrst two show f0 and s values, the third, the fourth
and the ﬁfth columns report proﬁts given by equations (23), (24) and (25). In
the sixth column we specify which of the three cases applies for the considered
parametric values and, ﬁnally, the last two columns present the solutions of
problem (4). The ninth column yields the value of t and it is empty because
t never exists for these values of parameters. This means that we never have
CASE 2 when Rp =2and w =1 . To this point remind that, in the previous
section, we noted that a high spread between Rp and w (here it is equal to 1),
reduces the probability of CASE 2, because it reinforces f(t) along time (see eq.
(19)). We also observed that, when s is very small, costs of becoming ethical
are small too and therefore CASE 3 can hold. In fact CASE 3 is veriﬁed for
high values of f0 and small values of s.
We can verify that, when f0 ≤ sw, CASE 1 always holds according to
Proposition 2 (see Appendix 2). Moreover, the higher is f0, the less likely is
CASE 1 to be applied. It is important to note that the corresponding price PA is
always less than Rp. Otherwise PMP’s market share would be zero. Nonetheless,
price will be equal to Rp at inﬁnity as we saw in section 4.1.
Having said that we have only one situation (when f0 =3and s =0 .05)in
which we can apply Proposition3described in Appendix 2. Under such circum-












θs2w2, but CASE 2
can not be applied because t does not exist, so the optimal corner solution will
be always along the side PA = Rp (CASE 3).
12Table 1.A – Optimal PMP price and SR choice under 














   
s 
 




      
  t  
0.05 50    19 1  0  1.5   
0.5 50    10 1 0 1.5   
0.5 
1 50    5 1  0  1.5   
0.05 25    19 1  0  1.5   
0.5 25    10 1 0 1.5   
1 
1 25    5 1  0  1.5   
0.05 16.666    19 3  1  2   
0.5  16.666   10 1  0  1.5  
1.5 
1  16.666   5 1  0  1.5  
0.05 12.5    19 3  1  2   
0.5 12.5    10 1 0 1.5   
2 
1 12.5    5 1  0  1.5   
0.05 10    19 3  1  2   
0.5 10    10 1 0 1.5   
2.5 
1 10    5 1  0.5  2   
0.05 8.3333    19 3  1  2   
0.5 8.3333    10 3 1 2  
3 
1  8.3333   5 1  0  1.5  
 
 
0 f 1 π 2 π 3 π A P
All situations left are included in the interval explained in the Remark 2
about Proposition 3 (see Appendix 2), when all cases hold. In such case optimal
solutions are found by comparing proﬁts under the three cases.
In Table 1.B we illustrate a diﬀerent scenario in which, caeteris paribus,
Rp =1 .1. In this way we may analyze a situation in which the spread between
Rp and w is signiﬁcantly lower than before.
Here PMP SR is more likely to occur as we expected, because f0 is relatively






in most scenarios (see Proposition 3 in Appendix






is the expression for λ0 when CASE 1 holds.







CASE 1 itself, according to the inequality (13). To have CASE 1 in Table 1.B
f0 has to be small relatively to sw. When all cases are possible (see Remark
2 in Appendix 2), CASE 1 never wins and it is more convenient for the PMP
to imitate forever, because costs of transfers are very low. This happens every
time s =0 .05.
13 
 






















           
A P  
      
  t  
0.05 0.5    1  3  1  1.1   
0.5 0.5    0.1  1  0  1.05   
0.5 
1 0.5    0.05  1  0  1.05   
0.05 0.25    1  3  1  1.1   
0.5 0.25 0.252  0.1  2  a*(t)  for t<4.64 
0       for t> 4.64 
(*) 
1.1     for t<4.64 
1.05   for t> 4.64 
4.64 
1 
1 0.25    0.05  1  0  1.5   
0.05 0.125   1  3  1  1.1   
0.5 0.125  0.155  0.1  2  a*(t) for t<24.36 
0       for t>24.36 
(*) 
1.1    for t<24.36 
1.05  for t>24.36 
24.36 
2 
1 0.125  0.132  0.05  2  a*(t) for t<13.66 
0       for t>13.66 
(*) 
1.1    for t<13.66 
1.05  for t>13.66 
13.66 
0.05 0.083   1  3  1  1.1   
0.5 0.083  0.131  0.1  2  a*(t) for t<35.53 
0       for t>35.53 
(*) 
1.1    for t<35.53 
1.05  for t>35.53 
35.53 
3 
1 0.083  0.098  0.05  2  a*(t) for t<24.04 
0       for t>24.04 
(*) 
1.1    for t<24.04 
1.05  for t>24.04 
24.04 
(*)   
 





































In all situations left we apply Remark 1 (see Appendix 2) comparing proﬁts
π1 and π2. CASE 2 always occurs and gives rise to optimal locations a(t) such as
those represented in ﬁgure 5.1. The time threshold t determining PMP switch
from partial to no SR is positively correlated to f0 and negatively to s. In fact the
higher is consumers’ psychological cost, the longer is ethical PMP’s SR choice.
On the other hand, the higher is the transfer, the more expensive is PMP’s SR
choice.









































0 = 1 
s = 0.5 
f
0 = 2 
s = 0.5 
f
0 = 2
s = 1   f
0 = 3 
s = 0.5 
Fig. 5.1. Transition from (partial) PMP’s SR choice to absence of SR for given
parametric conditions.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
What are the consequences of the growing consumer care for SR on product
market competition? Can proﬁt maximising behaviour and corporate social
responsibility go hands in hands and under what conditions? Why the emphasis
and advertising on corporate SR behavior is growing?
In this paper we try to provide a simple and tractable theoretical framework
in which these questions can be analyzed and partially answered. The paper
starts from the hypothesis, supported by empirical ﬁndings, that consumers’
willingness to pay for social and environmental issues is heterogeneous and
dynamically aﬀected by habit persistence. It shows that a monopolist proﬁt
maximizing producer optimally chooses prices and socially responsible stance
among three diﬀerent strategies for given values of consumers’ concern for so-
cial and environmental issues, production costs and consumers conditional (SR
independent) reservation prices. More speciﬁcally, we observe that the PMP is
interested in reducing its SR stance (or not to have it at all) not to reinforce
consumers SR purchasing habits. The only case in which he chooses perma-
nently SR is when the cost of social responsibility is low and the ratio between
consumers’ conditional (SR independent) reservation price and producer’s pro-
duction price is high enough so that SR costs can be entirely transferred on
15consumer prices.
A ﬁnal consideration on our results may be that the level of SR predicted by
the model in equilibrium may seem to low with respect to the one we observe.
A likely answer is that it depends from factors not considered in this version of
the model, such as the presence of proﬁto rn op r o ﬁtc o m p e t i t o r si nS Rw h i c h
maintain a higher level of consumer SR and force the PMP producer to a higher
SR stance.
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16Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
To analyze condition (13) we formulate two alternative hypotheses. The ﬁrst is
(i): ft→∞ ≤ sw − λt→∞
where we deﬁne ft→∞ and λt→∞ respectively as f and λ values for t which
tends to inﬁnity. We call t>0 a ﬁnite time such that hypothesis (i) holds for
t>t. In this situation the PMP chooses (0,P∗
A) and diﬀerential equations for
the state and the costate variables turn into:
f0(t)=−θf(t) (26)
λ






Moreover, the transversality condition (15) holds, when H is equal to H|(0,P ∗
A)
which is given by equation (9). From equation (26) we have that f(t)=fe−θt,








where c is a generic constant depending on the ﬁnal condition on λ(t).T h e














In (29) the ﬁrst term goes to zero as t →∞ , for θ<ρeverywhere, and
the second term is constant. To let the limit go to zero it must be that c =0 .








which is negative and decreasing.











sw -  λ(t)
f(t) 
Fig. A1.1. The dymamic of consumers’ cost of ethical distance under CASE 2.
Now we know the form of the two curves f(t) and sw − λ(t).B o t h a r e
positive, but the ﬁrst is decreasing while the second is increasing. This means
that there exists a time t ∈ ]−∞;+∞[ in which the two will intersect. Hence,
hypothesis (i) holds, as long as t goes back to t. In t = t we will have f(t)=
sw−λ(t) and, before t, the inequality of hypothesis (i) will be inverted (see ﬁgure
A1.1) and f(t) >s w− λ(t) persists going backward to time zero. To show this









and does not hold immediately before
b t. In t = b t it has to be f(b t)=sw−λ(b t): another intersection. Inside the interval £
b t;t
£
for λ(t) we will have the following Cauchy problem
(
λ
0(t)=( ρ + θ)λ(t)






where the ﬁnal condition is derived from equation (30) evaluated in t = t and
f = f(t) is such that f = sw − λ. The solution is λ(t)=λe(θ+ρ)(t−t) negative
and decreasing. So sw−λ(t) is again positive and increasing. Before b t functions
f(t) and λ(t) are given by equations (26) and (27). Again, f(t) is positive and
decreasing, while sw − λ(t) is positive and increasing. Hence, the following
hypothesis has to hold before b t : f(t<b t) ≤ sw − λ(t<b t). However, since
sw − λ(t) is increasing, we have sw − λ(t<b t) <s w− λ(b t)=f(b t). Given that
18f(t) is decreasing before b t, it has to be necessarily that f(b t) <f (t<b t), and
so sw − λ(t<b t) <f (t<b t) against the hypothesis we made in the beginning.
Consequently, b t can never exist and f(t) >s w− λ(t) will hold from zero to t.
The optimal location in this interval will be on the third corner solution (11).
We have deﬁned t by considering that it can assume negative values too,
in this way admitting the possibility that the PMP does not imitate ethical
behaviour at all, for every t ∈ [0,∞] (see ﬁgure A1.2). This situation can occur
also when t can not be calculated, as we saw in section 4.2.








sw -  λ(t) 
Fig. A.1.2. The dynamics of consumers’ cost of ethical distance under CASE 1.
We will talk about the situation represented in ﬁgure A1.2 as ”CASE 1”,
which corresponds to the ﬁrst behaviour deﬁned in Proposition 1. On the con-
trary, when t>0, PMP’s behaviour, represented in ﬁgure A1.1, corresponds to
the second strategy deﬁned in Proposition 1, which we call ”CASE 2”.
We now remove hypothesis (i) and deﬁne the following alternative:
(ii) ft→∞ ≥ sw − λt→∞
We call b t>0 a ﬁnite time such that hypothesis (ii) holds for t>b t.T h e
PMP chooses (a∗(t),R p)f o rt>b t. The Hamiltonian around inﬁnity is given
by equation (12). At inﬁnity, for λ(t) and f(t), we have eq. (19) and (20),
which, with f(b t)=b f and λ(b t)=b λ, generate two Cauchy problems solved by
the following:












sw − b λe(θ+ρ)(r−b t)




Combining the Hamiltonian of equation (12) and trasversality condition (15)







sw − b λe(θ+ρ)(t−b t) − θb λe−(θ+ρ)b t+θtf(t)=0 (34)




























sw − b λe(θ+ρ)(r−b t)












The integral function in parenthesis is not easy to solve, but we can study
the function g(r)= eθr
(sw−b λe(θ+ρ)(r−b t))
2. It behaves like eθr−2(θ+ρ)r as r goes to
inﬁnity. For this reason g(r) → 0. So its integral, evaluated between b t and
t →∞ ,i sﬁnite and positive. b f is ﬁnite and positive too, so the whole limit is
zero, if and only if b λ =0 .
Hypothesis (ii) is now ft→∞ ≥ sw. The inequality persists going back untill
t =0 , if f(t) is decreasing or constant.
However it is easy to show that it does not change even if f(t) is increasing.
In fact, if f(t) is increasing, then the two lines f(t) and sw could intersect each
other in b t and the inequality could change for t<b t. There would be a period for




,w h e n(0,P∗





(26) and (27) hold with two ﬁnal conditions: f(b t)=b f and λ(b t)=b λ =0 . This




, while f(t)= b fe−θ(t−b t) is decreasing.
So b t can never exist because, for t<b t,t h er e l a t i o nf(t) >s wcontinues to hold
and, in this situation, (0,P∗
A) can never be the optimal control. Here the PMP
imitates for every t and always adopts the corner solution with PA = Rp. The
optimal location will be the one deﬁned for the third corner solution, considering
λ =0 . W el a b e lt h i sa s” C A S E3 ” . ¤
20Appendix 2: Further parametric condition to dis-
criminate among the three cases
What we said about CASE 1 should not make it diﬃcult to understand the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: If f0 ≤ sw the optimal location will be a(t)=0∀t and the





Let us consider again hypotheses (i) and (ii) in Appendix 1 to see what
happens when f0 <s w .If hypothesis (i) holds CASE 2 can never hold because,
in t =0 , f(t)=f0 <s w<s w− λ(0), so that a(t)=0 . This means that only
CASE 1 can occur. On the contrary, if hypothesis (ii) holds, CASE 3 must
occur. But if CASE 3 holds we should have f0 >s wagainst the hypothesis
of Proposition 2.W ec o n c l u d et h a tC A S E1i st h eo n l yp o s s i b l ec h o i c ef o rt h e
PMP under f0 <s w . ¤
The result of Proposition 2 is quite obvious. We have already seen that, when
f0 is particularly small, and now we know that it has to be less than sw, social
responsibility is weak from the beginning and is not suﬃcient to trigger PMP’s
social responsibility. Remember again that, ever in this case, consumers’ care
for social responsibility is not without eﬀects, because the PMP is compelled
to choose a price lower than the contingent reservation price Rp, if he does not
want to lose his market share.

























θs2w2 that interval can be inﬁnite.
Proof:






, CASE 1 does not
hold.
Let us suppose, ab absurdo,t h a ti td o e sh o l d .T h i sm e a n st h a te i t h e rt does
not exist or, if it exists, it is negative, so that our problem is expressed by the
diﬀerential equations (26) and (27) with the usual initial condition f(t)=f0 and














Remembering that CASE 1 holds when f(t) ≤ sw−λ(t) ∀t ∈ [0;∞[, we should






, against the hypothesis formulated. The
two cases left can occur so we must have at least a ﬁnite period of PMP partial
SR choice.
To show the second part of the proposition let’s consider the deﬁnition of












































and, otherwise, increasing. CASE 3 can occur
when the inequality f(t) >s wpersists as t goes to inﬁnity. If that asymptote
is less than sw, f(t) is ﬁrst decreasing, until f(t) <s wand therefore CASE








Proposition 3 conﬁrms our intuition developed in section 4.3, that is, when







eﬀects on PMP’s location, which can be diﬀerent from zero. These eﬀects could
be permanent (CASE 3) if PMP’s costs of ethical behaviour, represented by sw,







This means that the PMP ﬁnds convenient to be ethical for ever, with a
location equal to a∗, when consumers’ psychological cost of ethical distance is
initially high and transfers are low, so that f(t) can never go below it (examples
in Tables 1.A and 1.B conﬁrm it). In this situation f(t) does not go to zero.
SR persists until inﬁnity and the PMP has to take into account it, continuing
to incorporate SR features in his product.
On the contrary, if transfers are high, then the PMP ﬁnds it convenient to





This happens because high transfers make location a∗ too expensive. At the
same time the PMP can not locate in zero because a high f0 would make his
market share too low. A positive, but close to the left extreme, location on
the ethical segment gives a small contribution to SR consumption and so to the
growth of f(t) in the law of motion (3). Hence, the solution of the diﬀerential
equation is given by eq. (21): f(t) goes to zero as t →∞ , SR interest vanishes
and the PMP can choose to locate in zero.






θs2w2, the PMP can be ethical for
ever if f(t) is decreasing. Actually, the probability that CASE 3 occurs is higher
22when f(t) is increasing. Nevertheless, if f(t) is increasing, SR not only does not
vanish, but becomes stronger and stronger over time. Therefore, regardless of













(hypothesis of Proposition 3), then CASE 3 can
occur, because costs of being ethical are always smaller than f(t).





θs2w2,s ow eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :






θs2w2, there exists a t ≥ 0 such that the PMP
does not imitate for t>t ∈ [0;∞[15.
To ﬁnd the optimal control in this situation (CASE 1 or CASE 2) we can
only calculate the whole proﬁt in both possible cases (in CASE 2 only if t exists)
and consider the one that yields the highest proﬁt, by comparing equations (23)
and (24).
In our analysis we left only one interval in which we do not know ap r i o r i
what is the optimal choice for the PMP:













three cases are possible.
Here we compare three proﬁts corresponding to the three diﬀerent cases (or
two cases if t does not exist), given by equations (23), (24) and (25).







, given the ﬁrst point of Proposition 3. Now we show it holds also for






. Therefore, in this situation only CASE 1 or CASE 2 can
occur.
23